The Dynamics of Retail Oligopolies by Paul Ellickson & Beresteanu Arie
The Dynamics of Retail Oligopolies




This paper examines competition between retail ﬁr m su s i n gad y n a m i cm o d e l
of strategic investment. Employing a panel dataset of store level observations span-
ning seven major retail industries, we propose and estimate a fully dynamic model of
chain level competition. Since ﬁrm’s investment, entry, and exit decisions are modeled
at the level of the chain, the unique, store level dataset that underlies our empirical
r e s u l t si sa g g r e g a t e dt ot h eﬁrm level using a variety of industry sources. Building on
the methods proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2002), we employ a two-step
estimation procedure in which policy functions are ﬁrst estimated from each ﬁrm’s ob-
served actions and outcomes are then matched to an equilibrium condition using forward
simulation. The parameters of the structural model are then used to evaluate merger
policy.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Retail ﬁrms account for a surprising fraction of economic activity. These ﬁrms employ
over 20% of the private sector workforce and produce nearly 13% of US GDP. Firms like
Wal-Mart and Target have played a prominent role in the development and diﬀusion of infor-
mation technologies, forcing upstream producers to lower prices and make complementary
investments in cost reducing innovations. The rise of the “big box” format and a contin-
ued emphasis on one stop shopping has both increased the variety of products and lowered
their costs. At the same time, many retail industries have become highly concentrated.
Most “category killers” compete locally with only one or two rivals. In some categories,
like oﬃce supplies, there are only two or three chains nationwide. Viewed more broadly,
these industries exhibit a highly skewed size distribution: a few giant chains compete with
a large number of marginal players. While the explosion in variety and reduction in price
is unambiguously beneﬁcial to consumers, the increase in concentration may be cause for
concern. In particular, it is unclear whether these industries are tending toward monopoly,
or if there are competing forces that maintain some symmetry, at least among the largest
ﬁrms. The goal of this paper is to develop a model of retail chain competition in which this
and other questions can be evaluated.
Understanding whether markets will eventually become dominated by a single ﬁrm re-
quires identifying the form of strategic investment (Athey & Schmutzler (2001), Besanko &
Doraszelski (2004)). For example, in markets where investments exhibit forces of increas-
ing dominance, it is well known that small asymmetries tend to be exacerbated over time,
yielding outcomes which are highly skewed (Athey & Schmutzler (2001)). In contrast, in
markets that exhibit global catch-up forces, equilibria tend to remain relatively balanced,
even when ﬁrms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (Besanko & Doraszelski (2004)). In the
context of retail competition, theorists have produced models consistent with both possi-
bilities, providing an obvious role for empirical analysis. In the current paper, we develop
a model of retail competition which accommodates both possibilities. By confronting the
model with data from several distinct industries, we hope to characterize how ﬁrms behave
in practice and, in so doing, identify the forces that shape competition between retail chains.
The theoretical framework proposed in this paper is based on Besanko & Doraszelski’s
2model of capacity accumulation, which extends the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
framework developed in Ericson & Pakes (1995). In the context of retail competition, a
ﬁrm’s capacity corresponds to the number of outlets it chooses to operate in each period.1
Following Ryan (2004), we allow ﬁrms to fully adjust the size of their chain each period by
either opening new stores or closing existing ones. After making these investments, ﬁrms
compete in the product market, which is characterized by a reduced form proﬁtf u n c t i o n
that depends on the current state of the industry and the level of population. Firms are
also subject to idiosyncratic shocks, treated here as private information. One set of shocks
impacts the investment process, allowing asymmetries to develop despite the assumption of
initially symmetric ﬁrms. Firms are also allowed to enter and exit, subject to a second set
of random shocks.
As Besanko & Doraszelski demonstrate, industry dynamics depend on both the form of
product market competition and the degree to which investments are reversible. While the
same form of competition is likely to hold across diﬀerent industries, the ease of recovering
investments is not. For example, video stores may be much easier to sell oﬀ than oﬃce
supply stores or movie theaters. This provides a potential explanation for heterogeneity in
industry evolution.
Our empirical strategy is to estimate this model of competition using data from seven
distinct retail oligopolies. Using a unique census of retail ﬁrms, we constructed separate
panels for each industry that track the dominant chains over eleven consecutive periods. Our
estimator is based on the two-step procedure proposed by Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2002)
(henceforth BBL) and implemented in a similar context to ours by Ryan (2004). In the ﬁrst
step, we recover the ﬁrm’s policy functions governing entry, exit, and investment. These
functions characterize ﬁrms beliefs regarding the evolution of their state variables and the
actions of their competitors. In the second step, we use the structure of the MPE to recover
the parameters that make those beliefs optimal. Following BBL, this is accomplished via
forward simulation. Using these estimates, we can then simulate various futures, compare
these to behavior observed in the data, and characterize the most likely evolution of each
industry. Furthermore, since we have recovered the structural parameters of the underlying
1Alternatively, one might think of stores as competing in store density by locating as close as possible to
the full set of consumers. This setting would then correspond to the original Ericson & Pakes (1995) quality
ladder example.
3model, we will then be able to perform policy experiments. In particular, we would like
to evaluate the impact of various proposed mergers and, after obtaining additional data,
perform some welfare analysis regarding the impact of overinvestment.
This paper builds on both the sizable literature on estimating static entry games as well
as more recent work on dynamics. Until recently, the empirical entry literature has mainly
employed static frameworks. As a consequence, the early papers were somewhat limited in
scope, focusing primarily on characterizing the number of ﬁrms that could ﬁti n t om a r k e t s
of various size. In a series of seminal papers, Bresnahan & Reiss examined the relative im-
portance of strategic and technological factors in determining market structure (Bresnahan
& Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991)). By comparing the threshold market size at which only a single
ﬁrm could survive to that which could sustain a second entrant, the authors were able to
distinguish empirically between the impact of sunk costs and the role of price competition.
Berry (1992) extended this analysis to include both heterogeneity across ﬁrms and the im-
pact of ﬁrm characteristics. More recently, Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2004) have extended
the static approach to incorporate various aspects of product diﬀerentiation, documenting
the empirical importance of both location and quality. In all of these studies, ﬁrms were
assumed to provide only single products. Moreover, the static setting has clearly limited our
ability to evaluate either merger policy or changes in the environment, as these are explic-
itly dynamic concepts. The emphasis on static (really two-period) frameworks was a direct
result of the complexity associated with estimating a truly dynamic model of competition.
Until recently, the burden was virtually insurmountable, as estimation required solving ex-
plicitly for an MPE via a nested ﬁxed-point procedure. This computational burden placed
severe restrictions on the ability to model complex interactions. However, the application of
two-step estimation techniques has eased the burden substantially (Aguirregabiria & Mira
(2002), Bajari et al. (2002), Pakes, Ostrovsky & Berry (2002), and Pesendorfer & Schmidt-
Dengler (2002)), opening the door to much more realistic modeling possibilities.2 Our goal
is to use these methods to estimate a truly dynamic model of entry in which ﬁrms are able
to constantly adjust their optimal size. Our paper is closest to the work of Ryan (2004), who
estimates a fully dynamic model of entry and investment in the cement industry. Using a
2See Benkard (2004) for an early application of these methods to learning and strategic pricing in the
commercial aircraft industry.
4panel of ﬁrms in geographically distinct markets, he is able to recover the full cost structure
of the industry and evaluate the welfare impact of a change in environmental policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the dataset.
Section 3 describes the theoretical framework. The empirical framework is described in
Section 4. The results of the ﬁrst and second steps of the estimation are presented in
Section 5 and the results of the policy experiments (TBD) are contained in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a
This paper is aimed at characterizing competition between large retail oligopolies. For the
most part, we have chosen to focus on the so called “category killers,” retail ﬁrms that
specialize in providing a wide array of choices in a relatively narrow class of products. This
retail segment has grown dramatically over the past 20 years and has consistently attracted
the attention of the anti-trust authorities. As a point of comparison, we will also examine
the fast food industry, which is also characterized by large chains (although many of these
stores are franchised). Store level data on the number of retail establishments (both ﬁrms
and stores) were drawn from biannual versions of the American Business Disk (ABD). Our
data span from the ﬁr s th a l fo f1 9 9 8t ot h eﬁrst half of 2003, yielding a total of 11 periods.
Although the ABD is primarily a library reference database, its publisher (InfoUSA) also
markets several commercial versions of this product used in constructing a variety of mailing
lists. The ABD contains information on the identity and locations of over 12 million retail
ﬁrms based on Yellow and White Page listings. The entries are updated continuously. Since
it is sold as a marketing and research tool to individuals and libraries, the accuracy of the
listings are cross-checked by direct phone calls to local businesses and through comparisons
with other independent resources. InfoUSA has been the leading ﬁrm in this industry for
over 15 years and advertises a 95% level of accuracy on its website. An earlier version of
this database was used by Bresnahan & Reiss (1987), who actually travelled to several of
the markets in their sample. They claimed to ﬁnd very few errors. Although we have found
some discrepancies in the total store counts with those published in alternative sources (i.e.
time-lines from the ﬁrm’s own websites), the diﬀerences are relatively small in magnitude.
5We constructed our sample as follows. Starting from the primary (six digit) SIC codes
associated with each retail category (e.g. 5812-08 for fast food, 5943-01 for oﬃce supplies),
we extracted the full set of ﬁrms associated with that classiﬁcation. The ABD records the
top 20 SIC codes that each store associates itself with, so this process sometimes produced
an odd collection of ﬁrms. We then eliminated any obvious mis-classiﬁcations (e.g. drug
stores in the sporting goods category, non-proﬁt ﬁrms) and merged the full set of years
using store identiﬁcation numbers unique to each observation. This created a store level
panel with 11 periods of data. At this point, we found some cases where stores exited and
re-entered the same location with the same phone number and manager. This occurred
often enough to suggest that these were not remodels or temporary shut-downs but more
likely coding errors in the ABD database. Based on this conclusion, we ﬁlled in the “missing
observations” for all of these cases.
The most challenging part of constructing the dataset involved linking individual stores
to their parent ﬁrms. Unfortunately, ABD does not record any ﬁrm identiﬁer codes, so we
had to construct these ourselves. For tractability, we decided to focus on only the largest
chains. We used Hoover’s Online database3 to identify the dominant ﬁr m si ne a c hi n d u s t r y .
Consulting both Hoover’s and the ﬁrm’s own websites, we then constructed a list of all
the operating names used by each ﬁrm at any point in time4. We then collapsed the data
across all years by name and constructed ﬁrm identiﬁers based on our master list. The ID
codes were then merged back into the store level dataset. We followed the same procedure
for each industry. For each ﬁrm in every period, we know the physical location of each
store (geocode), every SIC with which it is associated, the number of years it has been in
operation, and a categorical variable indicating its level of yearly sales. However, only the
store count is used in the subsequent analysis.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for each of our industries. The number of major
chains varies substantially, from a low of 3 in oﬃce supplies, to a high of 23 in fast food.
Surprisingly, across the six category killers, the share of total stores operated by the top
chains is clustered around two points, 13% and 30%. Store density varies from a low of
under 1 store per 100,000 in pet supplies to a high of almost 30 in fast food. Among
3http://www.hoovers.com
4It is not uncommon for retail ﬁrms to operate under several “ﬂag” names, especially if the ﬁrm has gone
through several mergers and consolidations.
6the category killers, video chains operate the highest number of stores. Although there is
substantial variation in both the number of stores operated and number of markets served
across all of these industries, the number of ﬁrms that contest each market is relatively
stable (again, with the exception of fast food). As has been noted elsewhere, the majority
of these markets are dominated by only 2 or 3 major ﬁr m s . T h e s em a r k e t sa r ea l s ov e r y
concentrated. Over a quarter of the MSAs are served by only one ﬁrm and the Herﬁndahl
indices correspond to one ﬁrm concentration ratios (C1) in the range of 50-70%.
Finally, there is a fair amount of turnover between periods. Although it is relatively rare
for a ﬁrm to exit a market completely, store closures are almost as common as openings.
Also, when ﬁrms enter a market for the ﬁrst time, they tend to open only a single store.
3M o d e l
Our model of competition between retail chains is based on Besanko & Doraszelski (2004)
as adapted to the empirical framework of Bajari et al. (2002). The game is in discrete
time with an inﬁnite horizon. We observe N ﬁrms (i =1 ,..,N)i nM geographic mar-
kets (m =1 ,..,M), taken here to be Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). For each
market/period combination, ﬁrms are classiﬁed as either incumbents or potential entrants,
based on whether they currently operate any stores in the given market. In each period,
each potential entrant privately observes an idiosyncratic shock determining their sunk cost
o fe n t r y .B a s e do nt h i sp r i v a t ed r a w ,t h e s eﬁrms decide whether to enter. Next, both the
incumbent ﬁrms and the potential entrants who have decided to enter observe an additional
shock to the marginal cost of investment, again treated as private information. At this
point, ﬁrms decide on the optimal level of investment (i.e. how many stores to open or
close) based on this investment draw and their current state. Of course, incumbents may
also choose to exit the market (entrants are only allowed to exit after competing in the
product market in the subsequent period). This decision is subject to a third (privately
observed) shock governing the scrap value associated with exiting the market. After ob-
serving all of these shocks and making their investments, incumbent ﬁrms then compete in
the product market (new entrants compete only in the subsequent period). The (reduced
form) proﬁt function characterizing the static payoﬀ from competing in the product market
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
Oﬃce Book Record Video Pet Sporting Fast food
supplies stores stores rentals stores goods restaurants
T o t a ln u m b e ro fc h a i n s 3 9 1 7 5 6 1 9 2 3
Chain stores share of SIC 0.28 0.13 0.3 0.28 0.14 0.13 0.18
Stores per 100,000 1.25 1.23 1.33 3.23 0.71 1.42 29.7
Chain size
Average 848 242 154 1509 241 137 2447
Minimum 787 19 6 77 59 11 51
Maximum 902 656 698 4940 585 634 9921
Number of MSA served
Average 231 104 59 167 79 58 192
Minimum 215 8 3 37 16 6 16
Maximum 256 267 214 321 177 219 327
Number of chains per MSA
Average 2.12 2.93 3.13 2.55 1.8 3.5 13.5
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Maximum 3 8 10 5 5 12 19
Number of entries 308 222 270 278 260 321 448
Stores built per entry 1.17 1.06 1.06 1.25 1.27 1.06 3.3
Number of exits 57 226 386 132 50 295 400
Stores closed per exit 1.04 1.14 1.1 1.18 1.02 1.07 1.34
Stores Built per period 1.36 1.26 1.17 2.05 1.45 1.14 1.85
Stores closed per period 1.18 1.33 1.32 1.52 1.09 1.16 1.64
Average Herﬁndahl Index
All periods 6169 4578 4749 5941 7452 4556 1148
First period 7071 4831 4784 6967 7885 4481 1141
Last period 5802 4717 5211 5607 7184 4515 1171
8is assumed to depend only on the number of stores operated by each ﬁrm in the current
period and the level of population (i.e. there are no unobserved shocks in this stage). For
notational convenience we will suppress the market subscript in what follows.
In period t, each market can therefore be described by an (N +1 ) -dimensional state
vector st ∈ S.T h eﬁrst N components of this vector describe the number of stores operated
by each ﬁrm, so that sit indicates the number of stores operated by ﬁrm i in period t.T h e
ﬁnal component of st describes the population at time t.
Given the state at time t (st), ﬁrms choose their levels of investment It (i.e. the number
of stores to open or close) simultaneously. Recall that this decision is conditional on the
realization of their privately observed cost shock νit. We assume that these shocks are
iid draws from a commonly known distribution G(·). Firms therefore choose their level of
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i (st) − C(It,s t)) (2)
where C(It,s t) is the cost of building new stores.
Finally, we assume that the transition between states can be characterized by the dis-
tribution P (st+1|st,I t), where the dependence on It applies only to the evolution of store
counts (i.e. we assume that population evolves exogenously). Following BBL, we focus
only on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and assume that the equilibrium
observed in the data is unique.
Given the Markov proﬁle σ mapping states into investments (σ : S×Rn → I), the value
function of ﬁrm i can be written in recursive form as:
Vi (s|σ)=Eν
£









For a strategy proﬁle σ to be an equilibrium, we then require that there be no ﬁrm i



















those who will 
be closed next 
period). 
t+1 
to σ given that all of its rivals use proﬁle σ. Speciﬁcally, σ is an MPE if






for all i,s, and σ0
i. It is this set of inequalities that forms the basis for the second step of the
estimation. Intuitively, the ﬁrst step involves recovering (as ﬂexibly as possible) estimates of
both σ (s,ν) and P (st+1|st,I t). With these estimates in hand, we then use the equilibrium
condition (4) to recover the dynamic parameters.
4 Entry, exit and investment costs
A ﬁrm’s decision regarding which action to take depends on the expected future value
resulting from that decision minus the cost of taking that action. To estimate the Markov
process governing the transition between states, we need to decompose the cost associated
with moving from one state to another into several components. Denote the number of
stores that chain i owns in the market in the current period si and the number of stores
that the chain intends to operate next period s0
i.
When a ﬁrm ﬁrst enters a market it incurs a sunk cost related to establishing a presence
in a new market regardless of how many stores it intends to operate in that market. This
cost is assumed to be a constant denoted by ENTRY.I fa ﬁrm is already present in the
market it can decide to exit the market. In that case the chain recovers a scrap value
10associated with leaving the market. This scrap value is assumed to be a constant denoted
by EXIT. A chain that is present in the market (either a new ﬁrm who decided to enter or
an incumbent who decided not to exit) can either increase or decrease the number of stores
it operates or do nothing at all. The ﬁxed cost of building a store is denoted by FC and is
assumed to be a random variable. A ﬁrm that chooses to close stores will recover a scrap
value equal to SCRAP. We assume the following on the random costs:
FC = FC+ εpos
SCRAP = SCRAP + εneg.
ENTRY, EXIT, FC and SCRAP are unknown parameters and εpos ∼ N(0,σ 2
pos) and
εin ∼ N(0,σ2
in). The error term associated with the ﬁxed cost of building a store and
the error term associated with the scrap value a ﬁrm receives from closing a store can be
correlated. The assumptions regarding the correlation between the two errors are explained
in Section 5. The correlation between εposand εneg comes from the fact that both costs are
related to real-estate prices and it is reasonable to assume that the random element in both
are correlated. Other costs like labor costs and local taxes may aﬀect FC and SCRAP
diﬀerently and therefore the correlation between εposand εneg is not perfect. The timing in
which these shocks are realized is as follows. In the beginning of the period εposand εneg
are realized. It is important to note that these investment decisions include entry and exit
decisions if those are relevant. A positive investment for stores that are not present in the
market means entry and negative investment equal to the number of stores operated by
achain means exit. The ﬁx e dc o s to fb u i l d i n gs t o r e si sb o r no rt h es c r a pv a l u ef r o mc l o s i n g
them is collected. Firms also bear entry cost or collect exit values if those are relevant. At
the end of the period the revenue from the stores that were open at the beginning of the
period is collected. Investment matures but will become productive only at t +1 .T h i s
timing is described in Figure 1.
5 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we describe our estimation strategy, which builds on the methodology de-
veloped by Bajari et al. (2002). The model is estimated using a two-step procedure. In
11the ﬁrst step, we estimate the policy functions that govern the transition between states, as
well as the exogenous process determining the evolution of population. In the second step,
these estimators are used to recover the parameters of the proﬁt function by simulating
many possible future paths. These steps are described in detail below.
5.1 First stage
Our strategy for estimating the policy functions governing the transition between states
requires several assumptions. First, the process governing the transitions is a ﬁrst-order
Markov: when ﬁr m sd e c i d ew h i c hs t a t et h e yw a n tt om o v et oi np e r i o dt+1, they condition
only on the state of the market at time t. Second, the ﬁrms in each market are ex-ante
symmetric. This implies that ﬁrm i treats the case where ﬁrms j and k operate a and b
stores respectively the same as it would treat the case where they operate b and a stores
instead. Third, all markets are treated as random draws from the same Markov process.
These assumptions allow us to pool together the observations from all periods, markets, and
ﬁrms. Suppressing market and time subscripts, let si denote the number of stores operated
by ﬁrm i and s−i the vector indicating the number of stores operated by ﬁrms other than i.
The same variables for the following period are denoted s0
i and s0
−i respectively, while other
demographics of the market are denoted by x.
Conditional on its own number of stores, the number of stores operated by its competi-
tors, and other market demographics, the ﬁrm makes two decisions jointly: how many new
stores to open and how many stores to close. The choice of how many stores to close is
limited by the number of existing stores: a ﬁrm can’t close more stores than it owns. Of
course, the option to close stores is also unavailable to potential entrants. The joint decision
to open and close stores is modeled using the following bivariate ordered probit model:
Pos∗
i =( si,s −i,x)0β − εpos
Neg∗















and β and γ are unknown vectors of coeﬃcients of an appropriate dimension. We do not
12observe (Pos∗
i,Neg∗
i) but we observe (Posi,Neg i) such that
Pos i = pi fπ p ≤ Pos∗
i <π p+1
Negi = gi fν g ≤ Neg∗
i <ν g+1
where p =0 ..P and g =0 ..G and π0 = ν0 = −∞, πP+1 = νG+1 = ∞. As mentioned earlier,
G can depend on the number of stores that the chain currently operates and can be equal
to zero, yielding a univariate ordered probit model. We estimate the coeﬃcients β and γ,
the thresholds π1...πP, and ν1...νG and the parameters ρ and σ2 using maximum-likelihood.
















dipg (−Fp+1,g+1 + Fp,g+1 + Fp+1,g − Fp,g)
















is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution.
To facilitate estimation, we restrict P and N to a small set of possible values. The
following tables describes the decisions made by incumbents and potential entrants (to be
added in the near future). They show that choosing P =2and N =2covers most of the
choices made by ﬁrms in our sample. Therefore, category “2 represents “two or more". For a
ﬁrm that is not present in the market the entry decision is estimated using univariate ordered
probit model. For a ﬁrms already present in the market the decision is estimated using a
bivariate ordered probit model described by the likelihood function (5). Due to boundery
condition the incumbents are separated into two groups: those who operate only one store
and those who operate two or more stores. The model choice model can be estimated
in several ways. First of all one should make a decision whether the likelihood functions
describing the decision of the three sub groups of ﬁrms share any common parameters. One
obvious set of prameters that they can share are ρ and σ2 which describe the shocks to
(de)investment. If we assume that the three sub groups draw (εpos,εneg) from potentially
13diﬀerent distributions, then the three likelihoods can be estimated separately. If they share
ac o m o nρ and σ2 then two options are available. First, a joint likelihood function should
be estimated with ρ and σ2 appearing in all components of that joint likelihood function.
Second, ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n sc a nb ed r i v e nf r o m( 5 )a n dt h e ns t u c k e dt o g e t h e ra n dt h e
parameters will be estimated through a GMM method. In this version of the paper we
choose to estimate the likelihood models separately for the three sub populations. The
predictions from the estimates in this step were compared with the frequencies computed
from the sample and were found to produce quite accurate predictions (see Section 5).
5.2 Second Stage
Given the estimates from the ﬁrst stage, we are now ready to estimate the parameters of
the payoﬀ and cost functions. Following Bajari et al. (2002), we specify a proﬁtf u n c t i o n
which is linear in its arguments. This reduces the computational burden substantially. The
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· 1[OWNt>0] (6)
where OWN i st h en u m b e ro fs t o r e st h ec h a i no p e r a t e s ,OTHER is the total number of
stores operated by competitors, ONE is a dummy variable equal to one if the chain has
only one competitor in the market and zero otherwise, and TWOis a dummy variable equal
to one if the chain has two competitors in the market. The costs related to investment or
de-investment are











−EXIT · 1(OWNt > 0 and OWNt+1 =0 )







+ equals x if x>0 and zero otherwise and (x)
− equals |x| if x<0 and zero
otherwise and 1(·) is the indicator function. The proﬁti st h e nπt = Rt−Ct and the present
value of the proﬁti sπ =
P∞
t=0 βtπt.
The results from the ﬁrst stage can be viewed as three vectors of coeﬃcients fully
describing the entry, exit and investment decisions. These vectors fully describe each ﬁrm’s
14strategy, denoted by σ. We denote an alternative strategy by ˜ σ, where alternative means
changing the values of the parameters governing the entry, exit and investment decisions.
As noted above, we consider only symmetric MPE. If σ is the optimal strategy, then using
an alternative strategy ˜ σ while the competitors use the strategy σ−i should yield a lower
present value of proﬁts than if the ﬁrm were to use σ. This should hold for any market,
regardless of initial conditions. Speciﬁcally, πi(σ,σ−i,s 0;α) ≥ πi(˜ σ,σ−is0;α) where s0
is the initial state of the market (i.e. a vector representing the number of stores that
each chain operates as well as exogenous market characteristics) and α is the vector of
structural parameters of the proﬁt function. We then estimate α using minimum-distance
criteria based on this inequality. The goal is to ﬁnd a parameter α such that the squared
diﬀerences between πi(σ,σ−i,s 0;α) and πi(˜ σ,σ−is0;α) are minimized for the cases where
πi(σ,σ−i,s 0;α) ≥ πi(˜ σ,σ−is0;α) is violated. This can be estimated using the following
integral
Z
1[πi(σ,σ−i,s0;α)−πi(˜ σ,σ−i,s0;α)<0][πi(σ,σ−i,s 0;α) − πi(˜ σ,σ−i,s 0;α)]
2 dF (˜ σ,s0)
where F (˜ σ,s0) is some distribution on the possible perturbations on the strategy σ and
starting state s0. In practice we evaluate this integral by perturbing the vector σ and by
picking a starting point s0 randomly from starting points observed in our sample. As a
result we evaluate the above integral using all the markets that appear in our data.
6 Empirical results
In this section we report the estimation results from the ﬁrst and second stages of estimation.
The ﬁrst stage, as we discussed above, estimates the transition probabilities regarding to
moving from one state to another. For a ﬁrm that is not present in the market the entry
decision is estimated using univariate ordered probit model. For a ﬁrms already present in
the market the decision is estimated using a bivariate ordered probit model described in
Section 5. Due to boundery condition the incumbents are separated into two groups: those
who operate only one store and those who operate two or more stores. Therefore, over all we
are estimating three ordered probit models: one univariate model and two bivariate models.
The results are summarized in the Tables 2, 3 and 4. The variables used in estimating the
Probit models are SHARE which represent the precent of stores that the ﬁrm operates
15out of the total number of stores in the market, ∆POP which is the percent change in
population and N which is the total number of competitors faced by the ﬁrm in the market.
The goal in step one is merely to get a good estimates of the equilibrium choice behavious
of the ﬁrms. In order to check the ﬁt of the models (beyond the value of the likelihood which
is unimformative) we compared the predictions of the model to the observed frequencies in
the data. The comparisson was done in the following way. We computed the frequencies of
actions as predicted by the model when the explanatory variables are at their mean value.
We also computed the (unconditional) frequencies of the various action pairs from the data.
The comparison is described in tables 5, 6 and 7.
The reader should interpret the numbers presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 with caution.
The parameters do not necessarily have the right sign or magnitude. The estimates merely
discribe the equilibrium behavious and the goal is to achieve a good prediction for the
equilibrium behavior.
We also present here initial results from estimating the second step. The results pre-
s e n t e dh e r ea r ef o rt h eO ﬃce Supplies industry only. The results demonstrate the coeﬃcient
that can be estimated using the second step.
16Table 2: Bivariate Probit model for incumbents with two or more stores
Positive investment Negative investment
SHARE 1.32 −0.96
Coeﬃshients ∆POP −6.81 3.00
N 0.56 −0.4





Table 3: Bivariate Probit model for incumbents with one store
Positive investment Negative investment
Coeﬃshients SHARE −0.25 −3.23
∆POP −12.13 2.55
N 0.33 0.51












17Table 5: Predictted and observed frequencies of actions - incumbents with two or more
stores
predicted by the model
0 1 2 cumulative
0 0.700 0.068 0.015 0.782
1 0.133 0.018 0.004 0.155
2 0.052 0.008 0.002 0.063
cumulative 0.885 0.094 0.021 1
Observed in the data
0 1 2 cumulative
0 0.694 0.065 0.011 0.770
1 0.1364 0.023 0.004 0.163
2 0.047 0.014 0.005 0.067
cumulative 0.878 0.102 0.020 1
Table 6: Predictted and observed frequencies of actions - incumbents with one store
predicted by the model
01 c u m u l a t i v e
0 0.940 0.009 0.948
1 0.043 0.0005 0.043
2 0.009 0.0001 0.009
cumulative 0.991 0.009 1
Observed in the data
01 c u m u l a t i v e
0 0.924 0.018 0.942
1 0.046 0.002 0.047
2 0.010 0.0007 0.011
cumulative 0.980 0.020 1
18Table 7: Predictted and observed frequencies of actions - potential entrants
predicted by the model
0
00 . 9 3 2
10 . 0 6 0
20 . 0 0 7
cumulative 1
Observed in the data
0
00 . 9 1 7
10 . 0 7 4
20 . 0 0 9
cumulative 1
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